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Abstract
Part I of this Note examines the concept of sovereignty and the role of the International Mon-
etary Fund (Fund) as an instrument of supranational or joint sovereignty. Part II traces the devel-
opment of economic dependence in Mexico and Argentina, examines the history of both public
and private lending to these nations, and suggests that their current indebtedness is an extension
of a chronic need for imported capital. Part III discusses the growth of international bank lending
to developing countries in the 1970’s, and Part IV examines the Fund’s role in the renegotiation
of sovereign debt. Part V addresses the relationship between modern economic interdependence
and sovereignty. The Note concludes that the relationship between commercial bank creditors
and their sovereign debtors is one that has grown beyond the legal mechanisms that coordinate
international economic relations.
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF DEBTOR NATIONS: A
COMPARISON OF MEXICAN AND ARGENTINE
REACTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
STABILIZATION
INTRODUCTION
Accepted definitions of national sovereignty distinguish
between economic interdependence of nations and activities
that impair the autonomy of sovereign states.' Economic in-
terdependence is permitted and even encouraged by the state,
while an infringement of sovereignty occurs, involuntarily.
2
However, when used to measure the effect of enormous inter-
national loans on the sovereignty of debtor nations, this dis-
tinction between voluntary and involuntary actions becomes
more difficult to discern.
Part I of this Note examines the concept of sovereignty
and the role of the International Monetary Fund3 (Fund) as an
1. See, e.g., H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE 320-21 (rev. 5th ed. 1978). In modern times, national sovereignty
means that a nation has "exclusiveness ofjurisdiction in certain domains." P.JESSUP,
A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 41 (1968). For example, one authority has stated that
"[s]overeignty is not actual independence in political, military, economic, or techno-
logical matters. The actual interdependence of nations in those matters . . . does
not normally affect their supreme lawgiving. . . authority within their own territories
... " H. MORGENTHAU, supra, at 320-21. Economic interdependence is not an inva-
sion of national sovereignty because the nations assume this interdependence volun-
tarily. Id.
2. H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 320-21.
3. The International Monetary Fund (Fund) was established by the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401,
T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter cited as Fund Agreement]. Its sister
organization, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank), was created by the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2
U.N.T.S. 134 [hereinafter cited as World Bank Agreement]. The Fund is a multilat-
eral organization designed to monitor its members' balance-of-payments and foreign
exchange rates. See Fund Agreement, supra, art. I, §§ (1), (v), (vi); Gold, Strengthening
the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443, 444 (1983).
The Fund was designed to address the short-term monetary problems of its member-
ship, while the World Bank was to administer to the members' long-term develop-
ment needs. Compare Interpretation of the Articles of Agreement, IMF Doc. No. 71-2
(Sept. 26, 1946) reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 19
(1970) (interpreting Fund Agreement, supra, art. VI, § 1 (a)) with World Bank Agree-
ment, supra, art. I, § (iii). For general background on the Fund, see E. MASON & R.
ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETrON WOODS (1973); Allen, The Recent Shift in
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instrument of supranational or joint sovereignty. Part II traces
the development of economic dependence in Mexico and Ar-
gentina, examines the history of both public and private lend-
ing 4 to these nations, and suggests that their current indebted-
ness is an extension of a chronic need for imported capital.
Part III discusses the growth of international bank lending to
developing countries in the 1970's, and Part IV examines the
Fund's role in the renegotiation of sovereign debt. Part V ad-
dresses the relationship between modern economic interde-
pendence and sovereignty. The Note concludes that the rela-
tionship between commercial bank creditors and their sover-
eign debtors is one that has grown beyond the legal
mechanisms that coordinate international economic relations.
The Note focuses on two of the largest sovereign debtors,
Mexico and Argentina,5 because they have reacted to pressure
United States Policies Toward the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 16 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 7 (1983).
The Fund Amendment, supra, has been amended twice. See Amendment of Arti-
cles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T.
2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726 U.N.T.S. 266 [hereinafter cited as First Fund Amend-
ment]; Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 [hereinafter cited as
Second Fund Amendment].
4. There are two ways that a nation may finance a deficit on its current account
of international balance-of-payments. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 24 (1982) [hereinafter cited as WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK]. A
sovereign borrower may finance its deficit by borrowing from the international cur-
rency reserves of the Fund and other international organizations such as the World
Bank. See Allen, supra note 3, at 7. Nations may also borrow from pivate financial
institutions. WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra, at 24. Recently, deve](oping nations
have borrowered from a syndicate of banks. See R.M. PECCHIOLI, THE INTERNATION-
ALISATION OF BANKING, THE POLICY ISSUES 22 (Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev. ed.
1983) [hereinafter cited as POLICY IssuEs]. High volume borrowers like Mexico and
Argentina have drawn from both of these sources. See infra notes 90-201 and accom-
panying text.
5. Riding, Latin Debt: Postponing the Burden, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at Fl,
col. 1. As of September 1984, Mexico owed U.S.$96 billion to international organi-
zations and commercial banks. Id. Argentina owed U.S.$45 billion. 1d.
The exposure of United States commercial banks to possible default by Latin
American governments is significant. As ofJune 30, 1980, the exposure of the nine
largest United States banks was 200% of their capital. Reisner, Default by Foreign Sov-
ereign Debtors: An Introductory Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3. By February, 1984
Argentina alone owed the nine largest commercial bank creditors a total of 153% of
their capital. The Battle of Wills Over Argentina's Debt, Bus. Week, Feb. 6, 1984, at 63.
The banks' Mexican exposure increased from 32% of capital in June of 1980 to 50%
of capital in June of 1982. Volcker, How Serious Is U.S. Bank Exposure?, Challenge,
May-June, 1983, 11, 17.
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from the Fund and commercial banks in strikingly different
ways. 6 Mexico, the first Latin American nation to nearly de-
fault on large debt payments, adopted a Fund austerity plan
shortly after the Mexican economy collapsed in August of
1982.' Argentina, by contrast, resisted pressure from the
Fund and the commercial banks until September 27, 1984,
when Argentine President, Ratil Alfonsin, began negotiations
with international banks.8 Unlike the Mexican people in 1982,
who supported President de la Madrid Hurtado's decision to
negotiate a stabilization plan with the Fund, the Argentine
people vigorously resisted Alfonsin's efforts to concede to in-
ternational pressure.'
6. See infra notes 90-201 and accompanying text.
7. Riding, Latin.Debt: Postponing the Burden, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at F9,
col. 1; see infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text. The difference in Mexico's and
Argentina's reaction to the Fund plan arose from traditional social and economic
differences in the two nations. Mexico always has been a poor country with a large
peasant population, while Argentina traditionally has been prosperous and middle
class in character. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. For Mexico, stabili-
zation or "austerity" measures merely are a return to normal. The Cheery Bit of Latin
America, Economist, Apr. 7-13, 1984, at 30. In Argentina, by contrast, cutbacks in
government spending represent a departure from the nation's customary lifestyle.
Flag Day For Argentina, Economist, Apr. 2-8, 1984, at 12.
Mexico and Argentina also have contrasting political climates. In Mexico, the
Partido Revolutionario Institutional (PRI) has dominated the political scene for the
last 55 years, see infra notes 105-45 and accompanying text, while in Argentina the
government now is in the hands of an opposition party after decades of alternating
between the control of the Peronist party and the Argentine military. See infra notes
159-201. The majority of Argentine resistance to the Fund's conditionality has come
from the strong Peronist labor unions. See, e.g., Di Tella, The Economic Policies of Argen-
tina's Labour-Based Government (1973-6), in INFLATION AND STABILISATION IN LATIN
AMERICA 181 (1979) (discussing the significant impact of labor unions on economic
and political developments in Argentina during the 1970's); Chavez, For Argentina
Austerity is a Bitter Pill, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at F8, col. I (work stoppage called
by Peronist labor unions in September 1984 as a protest against Fund stabilization
measures affected 80% of Argentina's industrial production).
Mexican labor unions, in contrast, have traditionally worked in tandem with the
ruling political party, and have not openly opposed the Fund-induced wage cuts.
Similar cuts in Argentina sparked general strikes in 1982 and 1984. Why It Is So Quiet,
Economist, Sept. 8-14, 1984, at 34; The Financial Crisis That Won't Go Away, Bus. Week,
Dec. 27, 1982, at 24. In Mexico, the labor union called off a scheduled November
1982 strike over wages, and the workers agreed to drop their demand for a 50%
wage increase. The Ripples From Mexico Are Crossing the Rio Grande, Economist, Nov. 20-
26, 1982, at 67.
8. Bennett, Argentina and Banks Begin Talks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1984, at D2,
col. 2; see infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Chavez, Argentine President Rallies Support, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1985,
at A3, col. 2 (labor unions call for general strike on May 23 to protest declining
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The contrast between the Mexican and Argentine reac-
tions to Fund stabilization measures highlights the question of
sovereignty. In the words of one authority, "[s]overeignty is
the supreme legal authority of the nation to give and enforce
the law within a certain territory . ". .. ,o Sovereignty is lost
"when it is placed under the authority of another nation, so
that it is the latter that exercises supreme authority to give and
enforce the laws within the former's territory.""
Traditionally, a distinction is made between an interfer-
ence with sovereignty and the economic interdependence of
nations. The distinction is that countries voluntarily assume
interdependence in economic matters, whereas an interference
with sovereignty occurs involuntarily.' 2 Economic interdepen-
dence may make it more difficult, or even impossible, for coun-
tries to pursue their own domestic policies, but it does not in-
vade national rights because it does not diminish the govern-
ments' authority.'3
The question remains, however, whether there is a point
at which interdependence, through the mechanism of a Fund
stability program, may become a violation of a nation's sover-
eign rights. Are commercial banks in the United States the
prime movers behind the Fund's stability measures? Are these
banks, in effect, controlling significant parts of Latin American
economies? Would a debtor nation's claim of interference
with its sovereignty provide the basis for a repudiation of their
foreign liability? These questions are likely to reappear with
the next oil crisis, the next rise in interest rates, or the next
recession.
I. SOVEREIGNTY AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Sovereignty is one of the concepts that gave rise to and
supports the notion of an international legal order.1' The fol-
wages); A New Crunch for Third World Debt, Bus. Week, May 28, 1984, at 29 (majority in
Argentine Senate pressured government to end negotiations with the Fund).
10. H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 321; see also P. JESSUP, supro note 1, at 41.
11. H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 321.
12. See id. at 320-21. Thus, "[a] nation can take upon itself any quantity of legal
restraints and still remain sovereign, provided those legal restraints do not affect its
quality as the supreme lawgiving and law-enforcing authority." Id. al: 320.
13. Id.
14. 1 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 256 (1968).
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lowing discussion of the term "sovereignty" will explain the
legal origins of international organizations like the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and will examine the sources and limita-
tions of their authority.
A. The Development of Sovereignty
In pre-Renaissance Europe, 5 a state's sovereign power
was "an absolute, uncontrolled state will,"' 6 restrained only by
Divine power. 7 As political and social conditions changed,
however, Renaissance and post-Renaissance jurists gradually
eroded the absolute view of national sovereignty by develop-
ing the concept of a "law of nations."' 8 One of the bases of
the law of nations was positivism, the belief that a nation is
bound only by the rules of international law to which it has
consented to be bound. 9 Positivism dominated the analysis of
international relations until the late nineteenth century.20
Positivism is a problematic concept. One of its weaknesses
is that it implies the existence of a law independent of a na-
tion's consent. 2 1 Another problem with positivism is that it
contradicts an idea that is necessary for its existence. 22 Positiv-
The concept of state sovereignty has been "[o]ne of the major cruces in the theory and
practice of the law of nations . Id.
15. Id. at 258.
16. P. JESSUP, supra note 1, at 40.
17. 1 J. VERZIJL, supra note 14, at 258. For example, the French jurist Jean Bo-
din (1530-96) concluded that "[alithough the King of France was supreme in power,
even he was not '/egibus solutus,' but subordinated to the commands of God and His
moral order." Id.
18. P. CORBETr, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATIONS OF STATES 20 (1951). The
proponents of a "law of nations" rejected the earlier theological view of a Divine will
as the only controlling power, and adopted instead a humanist approach to the rela-
tions between sovereign states. Id.
The writings of Aquinas, Vitoria, Vasquez, Gentili, Suarez, Grotius, and others
developed the idea of a law among nations by drawing a distinction between just and
unjust war. Id. They sought to persuade leaders "not to go to war except for grave
reasons defined in advance and, if war nevertheless came, to wage it in accordance
with fixed rules." Id. These writers supported their arguments for a law between
nations with citations to Roman and Canon Law and the works of ancient philoso-
phers. Id. "To call the system jus ... was to assert its place in a great genealogy of
thought, and at the same time to claim for it some of the special authority attaching
to the Digest, Code and Novels ofJustinian." Id.
19. Id. at 23.
20. Id. at 68.
21. Id. at 73.
22. Id.
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ism's reliance on the notion of consent postulates that all states
are equal.2 3 However, this equality is eliminated
if the whole legal system linking State A with another State
derives its validity from the latter's own will. . . . [Tihen A
alone is sovereign in the group and all other members are
subject to A's law. There can thus be only one sovereign at
a time, namely, the State from whose point of view the sys-
tem is being considered.24
By the early twentieth century, dissatisfaction wii.h positiv-
ism on a theoretical level was compounded by the desire to
limit the growing destructiveness of war through international
mediation.25 Thus, the main thrust of twentieth century legal
analysis of sovereignty has been toward replacing positivism
with a concept of sovereignty that can coexist with the notion
of a dominant international authority.26 During the 1930's and
1940's, scholars achieved this end by substituting the implied
"law" of positivism with the hypothesis that there is an interna-
tional community, the international community has a common
will, and "the will of the international community must be
obeyed."'27 In rejecting positivism, these scholars argued that
a nation's consent only means that it joins other consenting
nations in creating a communal will. 28 It is this joint will that is
the source of modern international legal authority.29'
B. The United Nations as an Instrument of Joint Sovereignty
The United Nations is a direct expression of this accept-
ance of a jointly sovereign will.30 On June 26, '1945, the
United Nations Conference on International Organization
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Jessup, International Law in the Post-War World, 36 AM. Soc. INT'L L.
PROC. 46-47 (1942).
26. P. CORBETr, supra note 18, at 70-71.
27. Id. at 73 (citing H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMUNITY 421 (1933)).
28. Id. at 74-75.
29. See id.
30. See 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 121 (3d ed. 1957). Interna-
tional law has limited sovereignty in a number of ways. Id. "Rules of international
customary law, general principles of law recognised by civilised nations, and above
all, treaties imposed farreaching limitations on the sovereignty of states. In a system
of interrelated legal principles, sovereignty is necessarily a relative concept." Id.
549
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adopted the Charter of the United Nations and established an
international organization known as the United Nations.3 ' The
preamble of the United Nations' Charter clearly states that the
document is an expression of a communal will. 32 The Charter
represents the signatories' deliberate subjugation of their sov-
ereign rights to an international legal body.33 However, the
signatories do not completely assign all of their rights to the
international organization. In article 2, paragraph 1, the Char-
ter states that the United Nations "is based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its Members ' 34 and article 2, para-
graph 7 identifies a sphere of "domestic jurisdiction" that re-
mains with the member state.3 5
The formation of the United Nations created three possi-
ble areas for the operation of international law.3 6 The first
governs matters that nations have specifically subjected to
rules established by international organizations.3 7 The second
area concerns sovereign rights reserved by member nations
under article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter.38 This area of do-
mestic jurisdiction or "reserved domain" is an area that inter-
national law "does not . . . regulate because it wishes to leave
to the sovereign States an independent sphere of activity not
bound by its prescriptions. ' ' 39 The third area where interna-
tional law may operate is where a matter is international in
31. U.N. CHARTER.
32. Id. preamble. The preamble of the United Nations Charter states:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding gener-
ations from the scourge of war. . . to establish conditions under which jus-
tice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and . . . interna-
tional law can be maintained. . . and for these ends . . . to employ interna-
tional machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement
of all peoples, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these
aims.
Id.
33. See P. CORBETr, supra note 18, at 74-75.
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
35. Id. art. 2, para. 7. Specifically, this provision states that "[n]othing contained
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter . Id.
(emphasis added).
36. 1 J. VERZJL, supra note 14, at 274.
37. Id. One authority described this area as "the group of matters which the law
of nations governs by means of positive rules." Id.
38. Id.; see supra note 35 (text of article 2, paragraph 7).
39. 1 J. VERZIJL, supra note 14, at 274.
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scope, but has escaped the regulation of an international or-
ganization.40
The boundaries between these three areas are flexible,
and react to changes in the social and economic conditions
that the United Nations' Charter and its members oversee.4"
The recent growth of international debt4 2 is one of the devel-
opments that tests this fluidity in international law. Originally
monitored by the Fund,43 an organization associated with the
United Nations, international debt has outgrown the original
"rules" of the international body designed to keep it in check.
C. The International Monetary Fund as an Instrument
of Joint Sovereignty
1. The Formation of the International Monetary Fund
Article 1 paragraph 3 of the United Nations Charter states
that one of the purposes of that organization is "[t]o achieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of
an economic. . . character."4 4 This goal is a reflection of aims
set forth at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. The Bret-
ton Woods Conference of 1944 initiated international cooper-
ation in economic and financial affairs by calling for the crea-
tion of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for In-
ternational Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) .4
Before Bretton Woods, nations considered "the unqualified
40. Id. This third area where international law may operate is nol a subset of
rights reserved by the nations that join an international regulatory institution. Id.
Instead, this area is for matters which should be subject to international regulation,
but which international organizations have not yet been able to control. Id.
41. See id.
42. Address by Paul A. Voicker, House of Representatives Committee on Bank-
ing, Finance and Urban Affairs, Table II (Feb. 2, 1983). In 1975, the total volume of
bank claims on developing nations was U.S.$62.7 billion. Id. By June (of 1982, this
figure had reached U.S.$268.3 billion, id., and over half of these claims arose from
loans to Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Id.
43. See infra notes 44-86 and accompanying text.
44. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
45. In July, 1944, after three years of preparation, representatives oF44 nations
met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to complete the formation of the Fund and
the World Bank. E. MASON & R. ASHER, supra note 3, at 1. The Fund and the World
Bank were created "[t]o promote international monetary co-operation," Fund Agree-
ment, supra note 3, art. I, § (i), and "[t]o assist in the reconstruction and development
of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capitial." World Bank
Agreement, supra note 3, art. I, § (i).
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right to determine the value of one's own currency. .. [as] an
essential feature of sovereignty." 46  The Bretton Woods
Agreements47 were established partly because of the economic
instability that this perception engendered in the years be-
tween the World Wars.48 During the 1920's and 1930's, many
nations' discriminatory currency arrangements, random valua-
tions of their currencies, and restrictive trade practices inhib-
ited international trade49 and contributed to the outbreak of
the Second World War.50 The Fund was designed to over-
come the destructive practices of the period between the wars
by encouraging international trade through restrictions on the
exchange practices of the Fund's membership.51
The nations that comprise the Fund agree to relinquish
control over the valuation of their currencies in the following
ways. Member nations must agree to establish a par value sys-
tem for their currencies,52 and cannot restrict payments and
transfers of foreign currency unless the Fund authorizes the
restrictions. 53  Finally, the Fund does not allow members to
use public policy arguments to justify their failure to honor an-
other government's exchange controls. 54
46. J. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANS-
ACTIONS, 2 (1965). Both institutions were officially established on December 27,
1945. See Fund Agreement, supra note 3; World Bank Agreement, supra note 3.
47. See supra note 45.
48. J. GOLD, supra note 46, at 2. One commentator has observed that
[i]ooking backward, one of the astounding features of international relations
before the Articles took effect is . . .that the value that a state could attri-
bute to its currency . ..was within its sole discretion. . . . The lesson of
experience has been that rates of exchange are matters of international con-
cern and . . .had better be made the subject of international regulation.
This has been done in a set of elaborate provisions in the Articles and in the
policies of the Fund based on those provisions.
Id.
49. See id. at 14-15.
50. A. VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM 3 (1977).
The economic and social disturbances of the 1920's and 1930's "accelerated the drift
to self-sufficiency, isolation and impoverishment, until finally the 'have-nots' resorted
to armed aggression on the plea of economic self-defense." Id.
51. See Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. I;J. GOLD, supra note 46, at 14-15.
52. Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. IV; seeJ. GOLD, supra note 46, at 3.
53. Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. IV, § 5(b); seeJ. GOLD, supra note 46, at 7.
54. See Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. V, § (5);J. GOLD, supra note 46, at 23-
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2. Borrowing from the Fund: "Conditionality"
When a member nation draws on the Fund's resources55 it
does so by using its own currency to "purchase" the currency
of another nation from the Fund.56 At the same time, the pur-
chaser agrees to "repurchase" its currency from the Fund at a
later date.57 This agreement is analogous to a loan from the
Fund, although a nation is not technically indebted to the Fund
unless it borrows over 100% of its quota.58 Once the member
borrows above this level, the Fund has the authority to condi-
tion any further access to the Fund's resources on the mem-
ber's adoption of measures designed to stabilize its economy.5 9
A borrowing member thus gains additional access to the
Fund's resources only when the member, with the assistance of
the Fund, develops a program of domestic policies designed to
stabilize the borrower's currency and balance-of-payments. 60
These policies are known as conditionality.6'
The legal basis of conditionality is the Fund's mandate to
use "adequate safeguards" to ensure the proper use of its re-
sources. 62 The Fund always has attached conditions to the use
of its resources, such as controlling inflation and decreasing
55. The Fund's resources traditionally come from the subscription quotas of the
Fund's members. J. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 870-76 (1977).
Since the Fund adopted the First Amendment to the Articles in 1968, First Fund
Amendment, supra note 3, member nations pay three-quarters of this quota in their
own currency and the remaining quarter or "tranche" in a reserve asset entitled
"Special Drawing Rights" (SDR's). Id. art. XXI; J. JACKSON, supra, at 876. The first
amendment authorized the Fund to use SDRs to replace gold as the primary asset of
the international monetary system. See id. art. XXV; J. JACKSON, supra, at 876. The
Fund bases the value of SDR's on the short-term rates received for several currencies
traded in euro-currency markets in the United States, Japan, West Germany, France,
and the United Kingdom. J. JACKSON, supra, at 876.
56. See Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. V; Comment, The Renegotiation of Offi-
cial International Debt: Whose Club Is It?, 17 U. CAL. DAVIS 853, 869 (1984).
57. See Second Fund Amendment, supra note 3, art. V, § 3(b)-(c); Comment,
supra note 56, at 869.
58. See Second Fund Amendment, supra note 3, art. V § 3(b)(iii); Comment,
supra note 56, at 869.
59. See Second Fund Amendment, supra note 3, art. V § 3(f; Comment, supra
note 56, at 869.
60. See Second Fund Amendment, supra note 3, art V § 3(a); Comment, supra
note 56, at 869.
61. Comment, supra note 56, at 869.
62. Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. I(v); J. WILLIAMSON, THE LENDING POLI-
CIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 9, 11 (Inst. for Int'l Econ. Monograph
No. 1, 1982).
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imports, but the terms of these conditions have varied consid-
erably since the Fund's inception.63 In the early years, the
Fund granted access to the higher credit tranches 64 with only
minimal conditionality.6 5 By 1953, however, the organization
had adopted a stronger position on the use of its resources 66
by limiting the level of conditionality to the size of the mem-
ber's loan.6 7 If the member's purchase was small, the Fund
would attach only minimal conditions.68 If the amount was
large, the Fund would require the borrower to adopt more
stringent policies.69
Low conditionality requires that the member nation prove
that it has a deficit, and state that the government is taking
steps to adjust its balance-of-payments. 7 0 The Fund usually
does not challenge such an assertion. 7 1 Stringent, or high con-
ditionality requires that the member design a specific program
to reduce its deficit.7 2 The Fund reserves the right to approve
or reject the plan prior to granting access to the Fund's re-
sources. 73 For the borrower, the Fund's sanction is essential
because it acts as a "seal-of-approval" and enables the bor-
rower to negotiate more loans on the private credit markets.7 4
Conditionality is important for a number of reasons. First,
it is an example of the deliberate delegation of certain aspects
of national sovereignty to an international body.75 Second, it
63. J. GOLD, CONDITIONALITY 1-13 (1979) (detailed description of the evolution
of conditionality by the former General Counsel of the Fund).
64. See supra note 56.
65. J. WILLIAMSON, supra note 62, at 11.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 11-12.
73. Second Fund Amendment, supra note 3, art. V, § 3(b).
74. J. GOLD, supra note 63, at 14. This effect has been described as follows:
The Fund's endorsement, and the member's observance, of a program have
become, increasingly, conditions for the entry into loan contracts by other
lenders or for making resources available under contracts. If a policy of the
Fund on the use of its resources does not call for the adoption of a program
by a member, the Fund's action in providing resources is less likely to in-
duce other parties to provide additional financing.
Id.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 44-54.
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is the Fund's means of ensuring that members use Fund re-
sources in ways that fulfill the Fund's original purpose. v6 Fi-
nally, the Fund's ability to impose conditions on its loans, not
the loans themselves, are what make the Fund essential to the
resolution of a debt crisis.77 Although the commercial banks'
exposure to the default of sovereign debtors like Mexico and
Argentina is extremely high, because they do not have the in-
ternational legal authority to impose conditions on their sover-
eign borrowers, they must use the Fund's conditionality as a
conduit for their own renegotiation terms. 78
3. Conditionality and Economic Interdependence
By becoming members of the Fund and submitting to a
program designed to restrict some of its economic and finan-
cial choices, a nation voluntarily relinquishes some of its sover-
eign authority. 79 In doing so, the nation adds conditionality to
a list of economic activities that link one nation with another
and make them economically interdependent. Economic inter-
dependence, in the sense of normal trade relations between
sovereign nations, may make it more difficult, or even impossi-
ble for nations to follow their own domestic policies, but it
does not invade national sovereignty because the nation con-
sented to the interdependence."s
Recently, however, the economic dependence created by
Fund conditionality has entered a new dimension. The con-
sent necessary to prevent an invasion of a reserved sovereign
right8' to determine economic policy binds the debtor nation
and the Fund.82 In the last several years, private commercial
banks, not the Fund, have become the debtor's primary credi-
tors. 83 A debtor nation's consent to the terms of a private loan
76. Gold, Use of the International Monetary Fund's Resources: "Conditionality" and
"Unconditionality" As Legal Categories, 6 J. INT'L L. EcON. 1, 24 (1971).
77. It's High Noon for IMF Funding: Congress Stalls, Threatening Loans to Troubled
Developing Countries, Bus. Week, Oct. 3, 1983, at 40 (interview with Anthony M. Solo-
mon, president of the New York Federal Reserve).
78. See infra notes 274-95 and accompanying text.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 44-54.
80. H. MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 320-21.
81. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
82. See Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. VIII.
83. See infra notes 204-73 and accompanying text.
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agreement should not be confused with consent to the subju-
gation of sovereign rights to a communal will.
Some indebted nations have tried to evade their interna-
tional obligations by arguing that Fund stabilization measures
are an invasion of their national sovereignty. In 1980, for ex-
ample, Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley used this ar-
gument to reject a Fund austerity plan.84 More recently, the
general secretary of Argentina's powerful labor confederation
claimed that his government's management of the national
debt " 'surrendered totally and absolutely' the patrimony of
the nation."8 5 Usually, criticism of this nature is loosely di-
rected at the Fund, the controlling political party, and the
United States Government.8 6
These attempts to evade international debt obligations
misuse the term "sovereignty" because their complaints are di-
rected toward the Fund and thus fall within the type of eco-
nomic interdependence to which member nations have con-
sented. The real problem raised by the increasing role of the
commercial banks in recent renegotiations of sovereign debt is
that it has removed the stabilization process from the category
of activities that member nations delegated to the Fund.87 Es-
calating foreign debt and increased participation of private
commercial bank lenders has created a new phenomenon that
is beyond the control of the Fund, and thus beyond the ex-
isting mechanism of joint sovereignty. The problem of sover-
84. Garvan, Bernall & Hughes, The IMF and the Third World: The Case of Jamaica,
1974-80, 2 DEV. DIALOGUE 113, 121-22 (1980). Despite Jamaica's need for major
refinancing, in January 1977 the Manley government rejected a recently negotiated
Fund program that would have required that Jamaica devalue its currency, freeze
wages, and balance the budget. Id. at 121. The Prime Minister told the nation:
[W]e are now facing a situation in which some of the people who could lend
us money will apparently do so only on the condition that they should be
able to tell us how to conduct our affairs. . . . [T]his government . . . will
not accept anybody anywhere. . . telling us what to do in our country. We
are the masters in our house and in our house there shall be no other master
but ourselves. Above all, we are not for sale.
Id. at 122.
85. Argentina Fires a Shot in The Debtor's Revolt, Bus. Week, Oct. 17, 1983, at 47.
86. See, e.g., Abdalla, The Inadequacy and Loss of Legitimacy of the International Mone-
tary Fund, 2 DEV. DIALOGUE 25, 37-38 (1980) (the Fund's policies should not apply to
developing members because developing nations, as a class, were under-represented
at the Bretton Woods Conference).
87. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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eign debt is not, as some political leaders have argued, 8 8 an
improper subject for cooperative international regulation, but
is instead an international problem that falls within the third
area of international law:8 9 where there is at present no con-
sensual international arrangement.
II. MEXICO AND ARGENTINA: A TRADITION OF
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE
The current Mexican and Argentine liquidity crisis is an
outgrowth of traditional Latin American dependence on the
economic conditions in the United States and Europe. Under
the theory of economic dependence, 90 an economically depen-
dent nation is one whose growth and development is condi-
tioned on the strength of another nation's economy.9' The
dominant country is economically self-sustaining, while the de-
pendent country's economic prosperity is linked to that of its
trading partners.9 2 According to this theory, economic depen-
dence is a self-perpetuating condition; only the exporting and
importing sectors of the dependent nation participate in and
benefit from contact with the international economy. 93 The in-
flux of foreign capital from imports is returned to the interna-
88. For example, in June and July of 1980, several developing nations met in
Tanzania for the North-South conference on "The International Monetary System
and the New International Monetary Order." The International Monetary System and the
New International Monetary Order, 2 DEV. DIALOGUE (1980). During this conference,
Tanzanian President Nyere characterized the Fund's conditions as "political interfer-
ence." Address by President Nyere, New Year Message 1980, reprinted in 2 DEV. DIA-
LOGUE 7, 9 (1980). Nyere labeled the Fund itself "a device by which powerful eco-
nomic forces in some rich nations increase their power over the poor nations of the
world." Id. at 8.
89. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
90. The theory of economic dependence was developed by Latin American
economists in the late 1950's and 1960's. See, e.g., F. CARDOSO & E. FALET-ro, DEPEN-
DENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA vii (M. Urquidi trans. 1979) (classic state-
ment of the dependency theory); Prebisch, Economic Development or Monetary Stability:
The False Dilemma, VI ECON. BULL. FOR LATIN AMERICA 1 (Mar. 1961). The depen-
dency theory is partly Marxist in origin, F. CARDOSO & E. FALETrO, supra, at vii, but
recent commentators employ the economic model of dependency without adopting
its ideological aspects. See, e.g., T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA
(1984).
91. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 9.
92. Id. at 10.
93. Id. Dependency, "[b]y its intrinsic character.., generated inequities, allo-
cating benefits to sectors participating in the world market and denying them to
other groups." Id.
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tional marketplace because the local economy does not pro-
vide enough goods for either business or domestic demand.94
In a dependent economy, therefore, there is no domestic in-
vestment in the nonexport businesses needed to develop eco-
nomic independence. 5 Economic dependence on the indus-
trialized nations leads to inherent limitations on the state's
own industrial growth.9 6 The resistance of some Latin Ameri-
can nations, particularly Argentina, to the Fund's conditional-
ity results from a desire to protect the steps they have made
toward economic autonomy.
Industrialization brought Mexico and Argentina into the
international markets for the first time since the former colo-
nies won independence from Spain in the early nineteenth
century.97 The growth of industry in Europe and the United
States developed a market for the raw materials and agricul-
tural products of the region, and the exports of Mexico, Ar-
gentina, and other Latin American nations attracted foreign in-
vestment in areas that supported the export trade.98
Between 1880 and 1930, the governing elites of both Mex-
ico and Argentina encouraged foreign investment and the ex-
port trade. 99 Leading politicians and businessmen encouraged
this development for a number of reasons. The prominent
groups endorsed the liberal, laissez-faire economic theories of
the day, and opposed the protectionist measures necessary to
shield local businesses from lower priced imports from Europe
and the United States.' 0 0 The Mexican and Argentine Govern-
ments also encouraged their economies to become dependent
on the export-import pattern because it kept prices low for
consumers.' 0 ' In addition, any government interference in or
promotion of local businesses might have been interpreted as a
94. Id.
95. Id. Profits from exports would "provide precious little capital for diversify-
ing the local economy, thus creating a situation that some observers would have la-
beled 'growth without development.' " Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 47.
98. Id. at 55-56. Railroad, shipping, and financial services were developed and
controlled by foreign investors. Id. at 74, 231.
99. Id.; see infra notes 105-15, 146-52 and accompanying text.
100. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 55-56. Latin American liberals
thought "deviation from liberal principles in economics must mean authoritarian
government, and it was therefore held in low regard." Id. at 56.
101. Id.
1985] SOVEREIGNTY AND FUND STABILIZATION 559
sign that the government was catering to private business at
the public's expense." 2
Since World War II, many Latin American nations have
tried to achieve economic independence from the economies
of their industrialized trading partners by substituting local
products for imports and by increasing the government's par-
ticipation in their economies. 10 3 Despite some success in in-
dustrialization and domestic investment, both Mexico and Ar-
gentina seem only to have changed the form of their economic
dependence. 104
A. Mexico's Economic History: Growth of an Export Economy
General Porfirio Diaz, who served as Mexico's President
from 1876 to 1911, welcomed foreign investment in the Mexi-
can economy. 0 5 For Diaz, the involvement of foreign inves-
tors was an opportunity to enhance the country's economic
power, rather than a threat to Mexico's independence. 10 6 Like
the Argentine leaders of the same era, Diaz espoused laissez-
faire policies that he enforced by centralizing power in a fed-
eral government. 117 Diaz actively encouraged foreign invest-
ment by granting private companies lucrative concessions in
areas such as railroad construction and oil exploration and by
refusing to impose tariffs on imports. 10 8 By the time Diaz left
102. Id. Opponents of government support of national industry usually
"charged . . . that a small group of selfish investors were seeking to profit at the
expense of the public." Id.
103. See R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S.
ENTERPRISES 99 (1971).
104. For a pre-1982 discussion of this concept, see Solomon, Developing Nations
and Commercial Banks: The New Dependency, 12J. INT'L L. & ECON. 325, 359-60 (1978).
105. R. VERNON, supra note 103, at 194. "The Diaz policy was to play the inter-
ests of British, French, and United States capital against each other." F. CARDOSO &
E. FALETrO, supra note 90, at 105.
106. R. VERNON, supra note 103, at 194-95.
107. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 230.
108. Id. The mining industry is an example of the extent of foreign investment
in Mexico during the Porfirian era. Mining produced nearly three-fifths of Mexico's
exports by the turn of the century, and was primarily controlled by United States
companies. C. CUMBERLAND, MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR MODERNITY 228 (1968);
Oliver, The Historical Perspective: A Vital Force in United States-Latin American Relations;
Neglected Here, Distorted There, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 423, 426 (1982). Another exam-
ple is the oil industry. Around 1900, the Mexican Government granted British and
United States oil companies real property interests in Mexico's subsurface oil and gas
fields. Id. This transaction violated the Mexican Constitution, which stated that sub-
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office in 1911, Mexico had become a haven for foreign inves-
tors. 10 9 According to one estimate, foreign investment in Mex-
ico was as high as two billion pesos." t0 Fifty percent of this
figure came from investors in the United States."'
This high level of foreign involvement in the Mexican
economy caused several problems. For example, foreign capi-
tal investments preempted the development of a system of in-
vestment by the Mexicans themselves."' The export-oriented
nature of the economy also inhibited the growth of an en-
trepreneurial class, a situation that was reenforced by the pov-
erty, low literacy level, and rural character of the Mexican pop-
ulation.11 3 As a result, there was no class of consumers to pro-
vide either the capital for industrial development or to provide
a market for domestically produced goods." 4
The Mexican Civil War erupted in 1911, and relations be-
tween Mexico and foreign investors deteriorated.' ' 5  Like
other Latin American nations, Mexico resented the United
States' interventionist approach to the region during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."t6 Mexico expressed
its antipathy toward foreigners in a number of ways. For ex-
ample, the drafters of the Constitution of 1917 wrote into that
surface property belonged to the public and could not be alienated by the state. Id.
at 425-26.
109. See C. CUMBERLAND, supra note 108, at 232. Between 1895 and 1910, the
Mexican treasury registered a surplus. Id. By 1911, tax revenues in Mexico were
over 100 million pesos, up from 15 million in 1876, and Mexican bonds sold at a
premium on international bond markets. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 231-32.
113. Id. at 231.
114. See T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 232.
115. C. CUMBERLAND, supra note 108, at 250.
116. Id.; see Oliver, supra note 108, at 430. In 1904, President Roosevelt an-
nounced a foreign policy position known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine. 1904 FOR. REL. Or U.S. XLI. The Corollary sought to prohibit European
interference in the affairs of the Americas and to authorize the United States inter-
vention to protect its interest. Id. "If a nation shows that it knows how to act with
.. . decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations,
it need fear no interference from the United States." Id. Two particular events rein-
forced Mexico's resentment of the United States' activity in the region. In 1913,
rumors indicated that the United States' Ambassador was connected with the assassi-
nation of President Madero. See F. CARDOSO & E. FALETrO, supra note 90, at 108. In
1914, United States troops occupied Veracruz at the direction of President Wilson.
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document two articles designed to restrict the activities of for-
eigners, and in the late 1920's the government formally ex-
pelled all non-Mexican priests." 7 In 1938, following years of
bitter controversy, the Mexican Government expropriated the
properties held by the United States and British oil companies
since the Porfirian Presidency." 8
The Second World War was a turning point in Mexico's
attempt to break away from the influence of United States and
European investors. The absence of competition from United
States and European manufacturers during the 1940's stimu-
lated fledgling Mexican industries." 9 Between 1946 and 1952,
President Alemin continued this development by adopting a
plan to expand Mexico's infrastructure and create a domestic
market for Mexican goods. 120 During this period, the govern-
ment spurred the growth of a domestic market and eased bal-
ance-of-payments by raising tariffs on imports.' 2' The Alemfin
plan contributed to the 9.2% growth of Mexican manufactur-
ing between 1948 and 1951, but in 1952, inflation overtook
these gains and the economy's expansion slowed. 22
Between 1952 and 1976, Mexico adhered to a par value
system designed to curb inflation.2 3 Initially, this hard money
policy succeeded in sustaining Mexico's prosperity by linking
the value of the peso to the price of the United States dollar. 124
For a time, this policy controlled inflation and increased Mex-
ico's attractiveness to foreign investors. 2 5 By the early 1970's,
117. C. CUMBERLAND, supra note 108, at 250.
118. Id.
119. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 243-44.
120. See id The high price of exports in the years following World War II sus-
tained the growth of domestic investment and a market for domestic products. F.
CARDOSO & E. FALETrO, supra note 90, at 150-51.
121. T. SKIMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 244.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 124.
124. Id. Traditionally, Mexico's "[elconomic activity is . . . linked to the US
business cycle, principally through fluctuations in demand for Mexican exports, but
also through price levels reflected in import prices. . . on the Mexican traded goods
sector." FitzGerald, Stabilisation Policy in Mexico: The Fiscal Deficit and Macroeconomic
Equilibrium 1960-77, in INFLATION AND STABILISATION IN LATIN AMERICA 23, 28 (1979)
(footnote omitted).
125. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 244. During the 1970's; Mexico
enacted legislation restricting foreign investment in new projects in Mexico to 49%.
The Ripples From Mexico Are Crossing the Rio Grande, Economist, Nov. 20-26, 1982, at 67-
68.
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however, the Mexican economy was in serious trouble. 26
Over 50% of the national budget went into state supported
companies and agencies. 127  This massive subsidization, 28
coupled with an increase in inflation, encouraged Mexicans to
convert pesos to dollars, or to invest outside the Mexican
economy. 129 Mexico's inflation rose to 20% between 1973 and
1974, and by 1976 this rate had increased by another 50%. l30
During this period Mexicans continued to convert pesos
to dollars, draining Mexico's foreign reserves. 13' Despite the
discovery of huge oil deposits in Mexico in late 1977, inflation
remained high. 32 Mexico continued to borrow heavily from
foreign lenders to meet its financial obligations. 3 3 Declining
world oil prices in the early 1980's significantly altered govern-
ment budget projections, resulting in steep increases in the
Mexican Government's borrowing in the international credit
markets. 
3 4
By the end of 1981, Mexico's foreign debt exceeded
U.S.$57 billion.' 35 Despite the government's attempts to stabi-
126. FitzGerald, supra note 124, at 28, 40. The growth of the Mexican economy
slowed in the mid-1960's. Exports declined as a percentage of the Mexican Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and imports remained constant. Id. This development had
two results. First, the government's current account balance moved from a U.S.$380
million deficit in 1965 to a U.S.$1076 million deficit in 1970. Id. at 29. Second, as
the deficit increased, the government increased borrowing from official creditors and
short-term foreign bank loans to private companies. Id. at 28.
127. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 248. The government's public
expenditures during the 1960's represented a long-term investment for the state.
FitzGerald, supra note 124, at 30-31. "Overall, the current and capital expenditure of
the Sector Publico Federal rose from 15 percent of gross domestic product in 1960 to
22 percent in 1968 and 29 percent in 1976, without a parallel increase in income."
Id. at 31.
128. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 249. By 1970, the government
had a controlling interest in nine of the top 10 Mexican companies. Id. at 248-49.
The government's investment in the Mexican economy rose from 1.7% of GDP in
1960 and 1964 to 3.2% of GDP in 1973 to 1976. FitzGerald, supra note 124, at 32.
129. FitzGerald, supra note 124, at 28.
130. T. SIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 249, 253.
131. Id. at 250-52.
132. Id. at 253. The country's earnings from oil production increased from
U.S.$500 million in 1976 to over U.S.$13 billion in 1981. Id. at 252-53.
133. Id. Although Mexico's oil exports totaled U.S.$14 billion in 1981, Mexico's
current account deficit was U.S.$13 billion during the same year. Volcker, How Seri-
ous is U.S. Bank Exposure?, Challenge, May-June, 1983, 11, 13.
134. Frazier, Mexico's Boom Dampened by Oil Glut, Wall St.J., Aug. 13, 1981, at 23,
col. 2.
135. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 253.
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lize the value of the peso, the Mexican economy continued to
deteriorate throughout the year. In February, when the na-
tion's annual inflation rate stood at 60%, President Lopez Por-
tillo nationalized Mexico's banks and devalued the peso by al-
most 100%.136 By the end of the year, Mexico's foreign debt
was U.S.$80 billion, or 15% of the gross national product. 37
In August, 1982 the Mexican Government suspended pay-
ments on its foreign debt and negotiated bridge loans 138 with
the Fund to cover the nation's immediate obligations.139  In
exchange for this assistance, the Mexican Government agreed
to impose certain restrictions on the economy. 40 Under the
Fund plan, the Mexican Government would reduce its heavy
subsidization of the business sector, and adopt measures to in-
crease exports, decrease the nation's reliance on imports, and
reduce inflation. 141
The newly elected de la Madrid administration quickly rat-
ified the austerity program negotiated by the previous govern-
ment. 42 By 1984, Mexico's inflation rate had fallen from its
1982 high of 100% to 60%.143 In February of 1985, however,
the Mexican Government announced that it was taking "emer-
gency measures" to contain the economic damage it sustained
as a result of an expected rise in interest rates on its foreign
debt and a drop in the price of oil.' 44 These measures in-
cluded a U.S.$465 million reduction in government expendi-
tures and the sale of 236 state-run companies. 45
136. Id. at 254-55.
137. Id.
138. Bridge loans are short-term loans intended to tide the debtor over until
payments from the Fund and the commercial banks actually begin. Farnsworth, Ar-
gentina Seen Near Bank Pact, IMF Package Hinges on Deal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1984, at
D10, col. 2. The United States' Government provided a bridge loan for Mexico in
1982 and for Argentina in 1984. Id.
139. Mexico, IMF Initial $4.5 Billion Loan Tied to Austerity, Wall St. J., Nov. 11,
1982, at 2, col. 3.
140. Riding, Latin Debt: Postponing the Burden, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at F9,
col. 1.
141. Id.
142. Farnsworth, IMF Loan to Mexico, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1982, at D4, col.3;
Mexico, IMF Initial $4.5 Billion Loan Tied to Austerity, Wall St.J., Nov. 11, 1982 at 2, col.
3.
143. Meislin, Mexico Tightens Austerity, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1985, at D4, col. 4.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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B. Argentina's Economic History
Argentina experienced a dramatic increase in trade with
Europe and the United States in the late nineteenth century. 146
This trade attracted foreign investment, but did not develop a
significant local industry or create a market for domestically
produced goods.' 4 7 As in Mexico, the development of an
economy dependent on the exchange of Argentine agriculture
products for foreign goods and capital laid the foundation for
the debt problem of the 1980's and for the Argentines' resist-
ance to the Fund's conditionality. 4 8
Argentina, like Mexico, achieved prosperity in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by providing Europe
with products it needed to fuel industrialization. 49 European
investors, not Argentines, financed and managed the busi-
nesses that supported Argentina's rapidly expanding interna-
tional trade.'5 0 Between 1880 and 1914, Britain financed
nearly the entire Argentine export economy: railroads, docks,
shipping, utilities, meatpacking houses, insurance companies,
and banks.' 5 ' The Argentine economy grew at a phenomenal
rate during this period, with the gross domestic product in-
creasing by a minimum of 5% annually.' 52
Between 1914 and 1946, fluctuations in international
trade directly affected the Argentine economy, illustrating the
nation's dependence on the export-import system. 53 The
peso value of exports, for example, doubled between 1915 and
1920 because World War I increased demand for Argentine
wheat and beef, 5 4 but dropped during the early 1920's. 55 By
1930, the peso had returned to its 1920 value, but five years
later the world-wide depression had forced the peso back to its
1915 price. 56 By the end of the 1930's, the peso had doubled
146. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 74-75.
147. Id. at 75.
148. See infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
149. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 74.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 75.
153. Id. at 75-76.
154. Id. at 75.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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in value.' 57 These swings in the value of the Argentine cur-
rency expanded and contracted the nation's money supply,
thereby stifling local investment.'5 8
During the 1940's, Juan Per6n rose to the presidency in
part because of his opposition to foreign influence in Argen-
tina.' 5 9 In particular, Per6n vehemently opposed joining the
Fund because he viewed the international organization as a
threat to Argentina's autonomy. 61 Per6n designed his own
anti-inflationary plans to curb Argentina's post-war infla-
tion. 16 1 These policies were initially successful, 62 but in 1955
a group of military officers ousted Per6n and immediately re-
versed Per6n's position on international economic cooperation
by joining the Fund. 63 After a succession of military and civil-
ian governments, Per6n returned to power in 1973.164 Shortly
thereafter, Per6n died in office and his wife Isabel succeeded
him. 165 A military junta removed Isabel from office in 1976,
partly because of the nation's poor economic condition. 166
The military government appointed a new Economic Min-
ister, Jos6 Martinez de Hoz, who designed an economic plan
known as the National Reorganization Process (NRP). 167 De
Hoz intended to decrease inflation by cutting tariffs and al-
157. Id.
158. See id. at 76.
159. Id. at 91-92.
160. Id. at 97.
161. Id. at 91-94. One economist described Per6n's foreign trade policy as the
'most comprehensive attempt yet made in Latin America to bring exports under the
control of the State." C. FURTADO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA 158
(1970).
162. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, supra note 90, at 92.
163. Id. at 94, 97. The following year Argentina asked the Fund to renegotiate
the terms of its loans. Comment, supra note 56, at 862.
164. Di Tella, supra note 7, at 182.
165. Id.
166. Id. Isabel Per6n's administration departed from the moderate position of
the previous government. Id. Juan Per6n's second administration, in general, fol-
lowed an economic program designed to distribute income in Argentina. Id. Isabel's
reformation of these programs sparked a violent reaction from labor unions. Id. In
1975, union members demanded a 100% wage increase. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH,
supra note 90, at 106. The government gave in to the unions' demands, and as a
result, inflation increased to 335%. Id. This rapid increase in prices caused a reduc-
tion in money supply. DiTella, supra note 7, at 184.
167. Martin, Argentines, Fearing Sudden Devaluation, Continue to Transfer Funds Out of
Pesos, Wall St.J., Feb. 17, 1981, at 35, col. 1.
565
566 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:544
lowing cheap imports to enter the Argentine market.' 68 Theo-
retically, these measures would foster competition, lower
prices for consumers and force Argentine producers to make
their operations more efficient. 169 Inefficient companies that
merely drained the economy would be eliminated by this pro-
cess.1 7 ° The NRP also planned to eliminate the currency spec-
ulation that was draining capital from the Argentine econ-
omy. 17 1 The government intended to prevent this outflow of
capital by announcing all currency devaluations one year in ad-
vance. 1
7 2
De Hoz's NRP program was unsuccessful. The military re-
gime insisted that certain industries remain protected from De
Hoz's cuts in government subsidization, thereby eliminating
one of the key elements of the NRP.'17 In addition, increased
competition from inexpensive exports caused a rash of corpo-
rate bankruptcies, which in turn led to the collapse of at least
sixty financial institutions.174 This chain of events had a signifi-
cant impact on the government's effort to curb spending. The
Argentine Government spent $6 billion reimbursing the bank-
rupt institutions' investors. 175
Another unsuccessful element of the NRP was its provi-
sion for currency devaluation. De Hoz deliberately allowed the
rate of devaluation to lag behind the rate of inflation, thereby
giving imports an effective discount.' 76 At the same time, this
practice harmed the nation's ranchers, farmers, and manufac-
turers who could not earn enough from exporting their goods
168. Id.; Salvaging an Economy After Seven Years of Chaos, Bus. Week, Feb. 6, 1984,
at 67. De Hoz' program was a radical departure from the economic policies of previ-
ous administrations: "After years of protectionism, Martinez de Hoz reduced tarriffs
sharply overnight, unleashing a flood of low-cost imports and submerging the coun-
try's cosseted import-substitution industries." Id. The NRP's exchange policy simul-
taneously harmed exporters by creating a 40% overvaluation of the peso. Id.
169. Martin, Argentines, Fearing Sudden Devaluation, Continue To Transfer Funds Out
of Pesos, Wall St.J., Feb. 17, 1981, at 35. col. 1.
170. See id.
171. Id. col. 2.
172. Id.
173. See Flag Day For Argentina, Economist, Apr. 2-8, 1984, at 11.
174. Martin, Argentina Announces Program to Bail Out Firms Caught in a Severe Credit
Squeeze, Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1981, at 38, col. 2.
175. Id.
176. Martin, Argentines, Fearing Sudden Devaluation, Continue to Transfer Funds Out of
Pesos, Wall St.J., Feb. 17, 1981, at 35, col. 2.
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to cover the cost of production. 7.7 It also affected the balance-
of-payments deficit by diminishing tax revenues and encourag-
ing Argentines to invest outside the country. 178
Unemployment, hyperinflation, and soaring national debt
characterized the Argentine economy of the early 1980's. In
1982 factories operated at 50% of capacity 179 and in 1981 and
1982 unemployment figures stood at an eight year high.18 0
Total output of goods and services dropped 4.5% between
1980 and 1981,181 and gross domestic product declined by 8%
in the first half of 1982.182 The cost of living increased by
87.6% between 1979 and 1980,183 and increased by another
83.6% in the following year. 18
4
In a vain attempt to curb Argentina's excessive inflation
rate, the government devalued the peso three times in 1981.85
Ironically, the government lost the most from the devalua-
tions. Although the government closed the currency ex-
changes for several days before announcing the devalua-
tions, 18 6 by the time the devaluations went into effect, most
businesses and individuals already had converted their hold-
ings into stronger currencies. 187 The government's devalua-
tion policy catalyzed a run on the nation's foreign currency
reserves, leaving the government with a large number of pe-
sos. 1 88 After doing so, the government devalued the currency,
177. Id. col. 1; Martin, Argentines Rush to Buy Dollars After Peso is Cut, Wall St.J.,
Feb. 13, 1981, at 20, col. 1.
178. Martin, Argentines Rush To Buy Dollars After Peso is Cut, Wall St. J., Feb. 13,
1981, at 20, col. 1. Before the government's 10% devaluation of the peso on Febru-
ary 2, 1981, the outflow of capital from Argentina was U.S.$50 million per day. Id.
The week after the evaluation, this figure rose to U.S.$280 million per day. Id.
179. Back From The Brink?, Economist, Nov. 20-26, 1982, at 69.
180. Wall St.J., Dec. 28, 1981, at 69.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Argentines Rush to Buy Dollars After Peso is Cut, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 198 1, at 20,
col. 1.
184. Wall St.J., Feb. 9, 1981, at 20, col. 2.
185. Martin, Argentina Devalues Its Currency by 30116, Wall St. J., June 2, 1981, at
34, col. 4; Argentines Rush To Sell Dollars After Peso is Cut, Wall St.J., Apr. 3, 198 1, at 25,
col. 3; Argentines Rush To Buy Dollars After Peso is Cut, Wall St.J., Feb. 13, 1981, at 20,
col. 1.
186. Martin, Argentina Devalues Its Currency by 3076, Wall St. J., June 2, 1981, at
34, col. 4; Argentines Rush to Sell Dollars after Peso is Cut, Wall St.J., Apr. 3, 1981, at 25,
col. 3.
187. Martin, Coping With Chaos, Wall St. J., June 29, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
188. Id.
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thereby diminishing its own cash reserves. 89
In response to this drain on foreign currency reserves, the
government increased rates on savings accounts. ' 90 The in-
crease in interest rates, however, also increased borrowing
rates for businesses, thus making it even more difficult for the
struggling business community to finance even its routine op-
erations.' 9 ' This rise in borrowing rates placed all but the
strongest companies in financially precarious positions be-
cause Argentine businesses survive hyperinflation only by roll-
ing over short-term loans. 192
President Alfonsin replaced the military junta in 1983.193
The first democratically elected, non-Peronist president in
years, Alfonsin did not have the political backing to impose
stringent Fund conditions on the Argentine economy.' 94 Al-
fonsin and Grinspun refused to "bow to the strictures of the
IMF" ' 95 so that they could build public support for the neces-
sary economic cuts and simultaneously hold out for more
favorable terms from the commercial banks. 196 In June of
1984, a meeting of several Latin American debtors, including
Argentina, started a rumor that these nations were forming a
"debtor's cartel."'' 97 This rumor was reinforced by the strong
public opposition to the adoption of Fund stabilization meas-
ures, 198 but no formal negotiating cartel emerged. In Septem-
ber 1984 the Argentine Government finally agreed to negoti-
ate a stabilization plan with the Fund. 99 As a condition to
such a plan, the Fund required the Argentine Government to
189. Id.
190. Martin, Argentina Announces Program to Bail Out Firms Caught in a Severe Credit
Squeeze, Wall St.J., Apr. 27, 1981, at 35, col. 1.
191. Id.
192. Id. col. 2.
193. Schumacher, Peronists Suffer a Stunning Defeat in Argentine Vote, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 1, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
194. See Alfonsin Unbowed, Economist, June 30-July 6, 1984, at 65; Intents and Pur-
poses, Economist, June 16-22, 1984, at 73; see also Argentina's New Hope, Bus. Week,
Feb. 6, 1984, at 63.
195. Alfonsin Unbowed, Economist, June 30-July 6, 1984, at 65.
196. Argentina's New Hope, Bus. Week, Feb. 6, 1984, at 63.
197. See, e.g., Debtor Nations Throw Down the Gauntlet-Gently, Bus. Week, Jul. 9,
1984, at 98; Gang of Four, Economist, May 26-June 1, 1984, at 88, 93.
198. See supra note 7 (discussing Peronist labor unions' opposition to condition-
ality); see also Argentina's New Hope, Bus. Week, Feb. 6, 1984, at 61.
199. Farnsworth, Argentina Seen Near Bank Pact, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1984, at
D10, col. 2.
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reach an agreement with its 320 creditor banks on a U.S.$20
billion refinancing package. 20 0 The government reached an
agreement with the Fund in late December of 1984,201 but by
February, 1985, when inflation was at an annual rate of over
1,300%,2 some observers feared that Argentina would not
meet the economic adjustment goals set forth in the Fund
Agreement. 20 3
III. BANK LENDING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IN THE 1970's
Several economic and political factors contributed to Mex-
ico's and Argentina's massive accumulation of foreign debt
during the 1970's and led to the uneasy balance between two
opposing powers: the banks and their sovereign debtors in
Latin America.
A. The Growth of International Bank Lending in the 1970's
In 1973 and 1974, the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries204 (OPEC) imposed an oil embargo on the
United States and Europe, drastically lowering the volume and
raising the price of petroleum exports to these countries.20 5
The embargo stimulated a dramatic increase in international
bank lending in a number of ways. Oil rich OPEC nations
flooded United States banks with deposits, giving the banks the
opportunity to invest large sums of money.20 6 The recession
in the industrialized world in 1974 and 1975 caused banks to
look elsewhere to invest.20 7 The banks eventually invested a
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Kreisler, 2 Top Argentina Officials Resign: Played Key Role in Debt Accord, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at D9, col. 1.
203. Riding, Argentina Denies Policy Shift, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at D14, col.
5.
204. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed
in September 1960 to allow oil producing nations to realize a larger share of crude
oil profits. F. WYANT, THE UNITED STATES, OPEC, AND MULTINATIONAL OIL 66-68
(1977). The original members of OPEC were Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Venezuela. Id. at 68.
205. Volcker, How Serious is U.S. Bank Exposure?, Challenge, May-June, 1983, at
12.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 12-13. At this time the banks also were confronting changing condi-
tions in traditional lending patterns. In the 1970's the banks' best creditors, large
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significant amount of these funds in loans to developing na-
tions.208
Developing countries like Mexico and Argentina were at-
tractive investments for several reasons. First, in times of ris-
ing oil prices and increasing awareness of the United States'
dependence on oil imported from the OPEC cartel, loans to oil
producing nations seemed an attractive investment. 2 9 Sec-
ond, Latin American nations were growing. 210 The combined
gross domestic product for the region increased at an annual
rate of nearly 6% between 1960 and 1974,21 1 and prices for
commodities produced by Latin America remained high.21 In
addition, the banks' confidence in their loans to developing
countries increased as the industry quickly responded to the
developing countries' demand for more financing from the pri-
vate sector.2 t3
1. Lending to Latin America: How the Banks
Viewed the Risk
a. The Nature of Lending Risk
The risks of lending fall into two categories: economic and
moral. "Economic hazard" is the risk that the borrower will
not be able to repay its debts. 214 "Moral hazard" is the risk
that the borrower will not be willing to fulfill its obligations. 1 5
When banks lend to domestic borrowers, the banks can
easily assess the economic hazard of the loan.21 6 The banks
may already be familiar with trends in the borrower's industry,
corporations, were avoiding bank financing by using alternatives such as commercial
paper. M. STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET: MYTH, REALITY AND PRACTICE 483-85
(1978).
208. POLICY ISSUES, supra note 4, at 20.
209. See id. at 22.
210. Address by Paul A. Volcker, American Swiss Association, New York, at 3
(Nov. 29, 1984).
211. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SURVEY, at 113 (Apr. 21, 1980).
212. Address by Paul A. Volcker, American Swiss Association, New York, at 3
(Nov. 29, 1984).
213. Id.
214. Guttentag & Herring, What Happens When Countries Cannot Pay Their Bank
Loans? The Renegotiation Process, 5J. COMP. Bus. L. 209, 213 (1983).
215. Id.
216. Id. In developed nations, "assessment of the ability of borrowers to repay is
facilitated by easy access to information and familiarity with the economy and the
culture." Id.
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and may know the borrower's reputation.21 7 Domestic loans
also have a more predictable moral hazard. Domestic loan
agreements include restrictive covenants and penalties that the
banks may enforce by invoking the power of the state.21 8
When banks lend to foreign governments, both the eco-
nomic and moral hazards of the loan increase. 21 9 The banks'
access to information about the borrower's economic and fi-
nancial condition is more limited and is expensive to obtain.220
In addition, during the 1970's the banks were unfamiliar with
evaluating the risks of lending to foreign governments. Unac-
customed to this type of lending, bankers used inconsistent
methods of examining the risks of these foreign loans.2 2' Also,
the banks' existing standards for evaluating potential creditors
were designed for private domestic borrowers or local govern-
ments, and were inadequate for measuring transfer risk22 2 or
the stability of foreign governments.223
The moral hazard of lending to foreign governments is
even greater. 2 4 In contrast to the moral hazard of domestic
loans, loans to countries like Mexico and Argentina cannot be
enforced by the lender state.225 The creditors' government has
limited power to compel other governments to repay their
loans.2 2 6 In the United States, some courts will not enforce
lending arrangements with foreign governments where default
217. Id.
218. Id. In the United States, the creditor may enforce such agreements under
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
219. Guttentag & Herring, supra note 214, at 213.
220. Id.
221. Volcker, How Serious Is U.S. Bank Exposure?, Challenge, May-June, 1983, at
15. Bankers "were also aware that blanket 'classifications' of a particular country...
could have sudden devastating effects on the availability of credit, sometimes defeat-
ing the possibility of orderly adjustment and inviting a misinterpretation that the U.S.
government might be making a political judgment." Id.
222. Transfer risk is the possibility that a country will use its sovereign power to
cut back its debt service payments, interrupt them, or withhold them altogether.
Guttentag & Herring, supra note 214, at 214. All foreign loans evaluated in curren-
cies other than the debtors' currency are open to transfer risk. Even if the sovereign
borrower uses the loan effectively, the loan is still vulnerable to transfer risk if an
inefficient sector of the borrower's economy lowers the nation's net earnings of for-
eign exchange and forces the government to suspend the debt service payment. Id.
at 230 n. 2.
223. Id. at 213.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 214.
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is a public act by a foreign sovereign government 227 or where
enforcement of the agreement is contrary to the United States'
foreign policy. 228
Creditors do have one weapon against breach by a sover-
eign debtor: the implied power to withhold further credit from
the borrower and to deny the country access to the interna-
tional bank lending facilities it needs to finance trade.229
"[D]epriving a borrower of access to international banking fa-
cilities is tantamount to depriving that borrower of participa-
tion in the international financial system. ' 230
2. How the Banks Limit Their Exposure
Banks with high levels of foreign loans have taken two
steps to reduce the risk associated with lending to foreign gov-
ernments. To distribute their exposure, large United States
banks have formed syndicates that typically include European
banks and other United States banks.2 3' The banks also have
applied the traditional short-leash lending technique as a sec-
ond hedge against sovereign debt exposure.232
227. See, e.g., IAM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982); Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1443
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). The usual remedy for nonrepayment of loans, attachment of the
debtor's assets, is prohibited in this situation by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
228. See, e.g., Allied Bank, 566 F. Supp. at 1444. The Second Circuit concluded in
Allied Bank that
[a] judgment in favor of Allied in this case would . ..[put] . ..the judicial
branch of the United States at odds with policies laid down by a foreign
government on an issue deemed by that government to be of central impor-
tance. Such an act by this court risks embarassment to the relations between
the executive branch of the United States and the government of Costa Rica.
Id.
229. Guttentag & Herring, supra note 214, at 215. This implied power has been
relatively successful in deterring sovereign default. With the exception of Cuba,
Ghana, and North Korea, debtor nations have not repudiated their loans. Id. at 214.
Even when new regimes ousted the governments that assumed the debt, the new-
comers continued to honor these obligations. Id. Another deterrent to breach is the
competitive nature of international banking. If a country was shut off from interna-
tional banking facilities, an aggressive bank might see the void as an opportunity to
lend to-the boycotted country at profitable terms. Id. at 215.
230. Id. at 215.
231. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 232-37.
232. Guttentag & Herring, supra note 214, at 216; see infra text accompanying
notes 238-50.
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a. Syndicate Loans
Syndicate loans, usually organized by a large bank, draw
creditors from the United States regional bank market and
from several nations.2 33 In addition to distributing the expo-
sure of the large bank at the head of the syndicate, the arrange-
ment deters default by the sovereign borrower.234 In contrast
to a loan made by a single bank, a syndicate loan involves a
larger number of banks and affects several markets in the
United States and abroad. 23- The debtor who falls behind on
the repayment of a syndicate loan therefore risks alienating a
significant portion of the international financial community. 236
A syndicate loan also increases the number of governments
that have an interest in the sovereign debtor's repayment.23 7
b. Benefits and Dangers of Short-Leash Refinancing
The short-leash technique is international lending's ver-
sion of the restrictive covenants found in domestic loan agree-
ments.238 In lieu of restrictive covenants, commercial banks
attempt to limit their exposure by keeping short maturities on
sovereign loans. 239 This technique forces the sovereign bor-
rower to renegotiate the loan frequently and may help the
lenders to influence the borrowers' macroeconomic policy. 240
233. Guttentag & Herring, supra note 214, at 215. See generally Clarke & Farrar,
Rights and Duties of Managing and Agent Banks in Syndicated Loans to Government Borrowers,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 229 (discussing the formation of syndicates and the obligations
assumed by managing and agent banks).
234. Guttentag & Herring, supra note 214, at 215.
235. Id.
236. Id. Access to international credit markets is important "[e]ven if a country
does not expect to be in a debtor position with regard to foreign banks. The country
may . . . find it essential to have balances at foreign banks in order to finance trade
flows .... " Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. "[C]ountry risk for foreign lending is reduced as the length of the obli-
gation decreases, since shorter maturities permit adjustments in exposure as balance
of payments or political conditions change." Id. at 216.
240. Id. Some authorities suggest that commercial banks loans to foreign gov-
ernments "are made with the implicit assumption that the borrower will manage its
economy so that the nation will maintain foreign exchange levels adequate to meet
the terms of repayment." Id. This assumption is not stated in the loan agreement
because the lender would be unable to enforce the such a covenant and "the explicit
statement of such conditions is likely to be viewed as an offensive intrusion on the
borrower's economic sovereignty." Id.
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The banks also use the short-leash approach to encourage
debtors to stay current on their debt repayment schedule.24 '
In theory, sovereign debtors will be less likely to withhold pay-
ments if they know they soon will have to confront their credi-
tors in renegotiations. 42
The commercial banks' use of shortened maturities only
superficially diminishes the credit risks of lending to sovereign
debtors.2 43 In effect, the technique has accelerated the debt
problems of countries like Mexico and Argentina, and has con-
tributed to the instability of the international banking sys-
tem.24 4 The viability of the short-leash approach depends on
the assumption that every bank can react to a repayment prob-
lem before its competition and can withdraw, leaving the bur-
den of its exposure on other creditors. 245 This premise creates
a false sense of security in the lending banks. The short-term
technique is designed to protect the interests of a single credi-
tor.246 If the banks' competition also uses shortened maturi-
ties as a hedge against default, the loss-cutting advantage of
the technique is diminished because it is possible that all the
members of the syndicate may withdraw their funds at once.24 7
Short-term maturities also create problems for the bor-
rower. The practice questions the certainty of the nation's
sources of financing, and may encourage the debtor to adopt
temporary solutions rather than long-term plans for adjust-
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. The debt repayment schedules of a short-leash loan agreement "are
related less to the capacity of the borrower to repay than to the need to influence the
borrower's willingness to repay. Loan maturities tend to be shorter than those that
are optimal from the standpoint of repayment capacity." Id. at 217.
244. See generally id. at 217-18.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 216-17. The problem has been explained as follows:
A current account deficit arising from any source that is accompanied by an
adverse shift in expectations regarding the government's policies can thus
lead to a "run", an unwillingness of holders of maturing obligations to roll
them over. The larger the volume of such obligations coming due in any
period, the larger the magnitude of any potential run. Thus, the more "con-
servative" banks are in protecting themselves individually against moral haz-
ard by keeping maturities short, the more likely that a balance-of-payments
deficit . . . will lead to a debt crisis.
Id. at 218.
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ment.2 48 The constant renegotiations that result from short-
term maturities also are expensive for the debtor and distract
the nation's talent from the task of finding permanent solu-
tions to their country's problems. 49
When the level of exposure is high, and there are a large
number of creditors, the commercial banks' belief that the
short-leash approach protects the creditor with superior infor-
mation is shortsighted.250 Ultimately, the technique prevents
both creditors and debtors from taking a more realistic view of
the risks involved. 51
3. The Impact of Inflation on Bank Lending
to Latin America
The commercial banks continued to lend to Latin Ameri-
can nations throughout the late 1970's252 despite growing for-
eign deficits in these countries and despite the banks' own de-
clining capital ratios and liquidity. 253 During this period, in-
creasing world-wide inflation, and the distortions it
engendered, played a key role in the exponential growth of
bank lending to Latin American nations.
From the lenders' perspective, the high inflation rates of
the late 1970's appeared to offset the rising level of the banks'
sovereign debt exposure. 254 Throughout the 1970's "rising
world inflation, and low or even negative 'real' interest rates
greatly moderated the rising debt ratios. Moreover, with credit
in ample supply, most of the largest [sovereign] borrowers
were able to add substantial amounts to their official reserve
assets . . . tending to maintain confidence in their financial
management and outlook. '255 The commercial banks contin-
ued to lend to countries like Mexico and Argentina because the
248. Id. at 220.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 216-17.
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
253. Address by Paul A. Volcker, American Swiss Association, New York, at 4
(Nov. 29, 1984).
254. Id.
255. Volcker, How Serious Is U.S. Bank Exposure?, Challenge, May-June, 1983, 11,
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banks made several false assumptions.2 56 First, the banks an-
ticipated that inflation would remain high and real interest
rates would remain low. 257 Second, the banks assumed that
the borrowing governments would continue to sustain eco-
nomic growth.258 Finally, the lenders believed that modern
times were immune to financial disaster, and that the financial
crises of the past "were more a relic of history than a future
threat. ' 259  These miscalculations resulted in a situation in
which "both interest payments and debt maturities were, in ef-
fect, being made only with the proceeds of new loans ...
But [this condition] is sustainable only when the debt is main-
tained, ... in some manageable relationship to real growth
and productivity, with a liquidity or borrowing cushion against
inevitable periods of recession and disturbance. 260
B. Mexico and Argentina Borrow from the Commercial Banks to
Avoid Fund Conditionality
Despite the higher interest charges and shorter maturities
of loans from commercial banks, developing countries like
Mexico and Argentina were as eager to borrow from the com-
mercial banks as the banks were to lend. 26 1 During the 1960's,
developing countries had borrowed from the Fund under the
256. Address by Paul A. Volcker, American Swiss Association, New York, at 3
(Nov. 29, 1984).
257. Id.
258. Id. Between 1960 and 1979, the GDP of the Latin American region tripled,
rising from U.S.$149 billion in 1960 to U.S.$430 billion in 1979 (constant 1978 dol-
lars). INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SURVEY, at 117 (Apr. 21, 1980). As a percent-
age of total growth in industrialized nations during this period, the region's GDP
increased from six percent in 1960 to eight percent in 1979. Id.
259. Address by Paul A. Volcker, American Swiss Association, New York, at 3
(Nov. 29, 1984). Volcker claims that despite these problems, Latin America contin-
ued to be a sound investment. In his opinion, the losses sustained by the commercial
banks on loans to such developed nations "continued to be substantially lower than
on domestic lending-as they had been for many years. Foreign lending accounted
for a rising share of the assets and earnings of most large international banks, both
U.S. and foreign based." Volcker, How Serious is U.S. Bank Exposure?, Challenge, May-
June, 1983, at 11, 13. Volcker does not discuss the possibility that the banks may
have been finding ways to make the loans continue to look profitable despite growing
indications that the loans would not be repayed on schedule.
260. Address by Paul A. Volcker, American Swiss Association, New York, at 3-4
(Nov. 29, 1984).
261. Guttentag & Herring, supra note 214, at 221. By the 1970's, the Fund had
became known as a lender of last resort. See J. WILLIAMSON, supra note 62, at 12.
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Fund's conditional "stand-by" arrangements.262 Although
these arrangements encouraged borrowers to impose internal
controls,263 the controls were politically unpopular and gave
the Fund a reputation for inflexibility.264 When banking condi-
tions in the United States and other industrialized nations
made the private financial markets more accessible to develop-
ing countries, these countries were willing to borrow at less
favorable rates in order to avoid the political cost of the Fund's
conditionality. 265
Between 1978 and 1980, a second large jump in oil prices
caused the world economy to slip into recession once again,
triggering a fall in commodity prices and shrinking the export
markets for goods manufactured in Latin America.266 High in-
terest rates increased the cost of servicing debts tied to market
rates and forced debtor nations to raise their own interest rates
262. See id.
263. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
264. Stand-By Credit Arrangements, IMF Doc. 155-(52/57) para. 2 (Oct. 1,
1952) reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 25 (1970); J.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 62, at 12. As developing countries increased their purchases
from the Fund during the 1960's and 1970's, the borrowers moved into higher condi-
tionality, and the Fund became more involved in the borrowing government's admin-
istration of its currency imbalances. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SURVEY, at
117 (Apr. 21, 1980). The Fund's reserves of Latin American currencies tripled be-
tween 1970 and 1973, and by 1979 this figure had doubled again. Id. In 1974, the
Fund's gross reserves were U.S.$18.2 billion. Id. This figure climbed to U.S.$38
billion by 1979, nearly a 94% increase in borrowing from the Fund. Id.
In response to growing complaints about the Fund's interference in the affairs of
members subject to high conditionality, in March of 1979 the Executive Board
adopted a decision on "Use of Fund's General Resources and Stand-by Arrange-
ments." INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SURVEY, at 38 (Feb. 4, 1980).
Paragraph 4 of the decision reflects the Fund's "willingness to accommodate the
views of developing members." J. GOLD, supra note 63, at 22. This section of the
decision requires the Fund to give due regard to the domestic social and political
objectives, the economic priorities and the circumstances of members, including the
causes of their balance of payment problems. Id. The broad language of paragraph
4 reveals the Fund's sensitivity to criticism from the developing members during the
late 1970's and early 1980's. The language "circumstances of the members" requires
the Fund to "[accept] as beyond debate a member's economic organization [includ-
ing] . .. the extent to which the economy is under government ownership or con-
trol. Id. at 23. "Only that attitude would be consistent with the technical mission of
the Fund, the principle of universal membership and the uniform treatment of all
members." Id. at 23-24.
265. Guttentag & Herring, supra note 214, at 221; see supra notes 55-78 and ac-
companying text (discussing conditionality).
266. Volcker, How Serious Is U.S. Bank Exposure?, Challenge, May-June, 1983, 11,
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to prevent the flight of capital.267 This curtailed the develop-
ment of business and deprived the governments of tax revenue
that such development would have provided.268 By the end of
the decade, the Latin American region had a U.S.$20 billion
annual increase in its combined current account deficit; a five-
fold increase since 197 1.269
Despite the dual pressures of shrinking revenue and in-
creasing interest payments on existing debt, borrowers like
Mexico and Argentina did not impose effective domestic con-
trols. 270 The indebted governments' failure to react to the re-
cession led to a sharp increase in domestic inflation, a corre-
sponding increase in deficits, and continued conversion of cap-
ital into investments of a more stable value. 271 Throughout
the late 1970's, these sovereign debtors avoided borrowing
from the Fund and continued to rely primarily on financing
from commercial banks.272 This reliance increased as other
sources of revenue raising, particularly, the external bond mar-
ket, lost faith in the credit of developing nations. 73
267. Address by Paul A. Voicker, Swiss American Association, New York, at 4
(Nov. 29, 1984).
268. Id. at 12.
269. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SURVEY, at 117 (Apr. 21, 1980). From
1971 to 1973, the annual increase in the region's current account deficit was U.S.$4
billion. Id. By 1981, the annual increase in this figure was U.S.$33.7 billion. INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY FUND SURVEY, at 15 (Jan. 11, 1982). The region's foreign debt
was nearly U.S.$240 billion in 1981, a fourfold increase since 1977. Id.
270. Volcker, How Serious is U.S. Bank Exposure?, Challenge, May-June, 1983, 11,
12-13.
271. Id.
272. See Guttentag & Herring, supra note 214, at 221.
273. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND SURVEY, at 129 (May 10, 1982). The
external bond markets, which market foreign bonds (bonds issued in a single na-
tional market) and eurobonds (bonds underwritten and sold in several markets) are
popular with developing countries because they allow these countries to diversify
their sources of financing. Id. The bond market also is attractive to developing coun-
tries because bonds provide long-term financing at fixed rates. Id.
Developing countries' percentage of total external bond issues increased from
3.3% in 1970 to 6.1% in 1976. Id. at 139. By 1978, this figure had risen to 15.5%
and represented nearly 10% of the combined current accounts of the developing
nations. Id.
The developing countries' ability to borrow on these markets has declined sig-
nificantly since the late 1970's. Id. Investors lost interest in the bond markets for a
number of reasons. First, interest rates were volatile and investors were unwilling to
commit themselves to a fixed rate. Id. Second, local governments were entering the
bond market to obtain fixed rate financing. Id. Bond market investors traditionally
expect the issuer to have a high credit rating. Id. at 139-40. Those who did invest
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IV. THE RESCHEDULING OF OFFICIAL
AND PRIVATE DEBT
A. The Paris Club
Renegotiation of sovereign debt begins when an indebted
nation requests a meeting of the Paris Club, the Fund's ad hoc,
multilateral rescheduling group. 274 The rescheduling of offi-
cial debt negotiated by the debtor and the Paris Club is usually
followed by a renegotiation of loans to commercial banks.275
The Paris Club agreement may state the terms of the private
debt rescheduling as an express condition to the official debt
agreement, and recent documents signed by the United States
provide that the debtor must reschedule private loans on the
same terms as those negotiated by the Fund.2 7 6
Commercial banks traditionally resisted the 'notion that
the renegotiation of their loans to sovereign debtors should
correspond to the terms of the Paris Club agreements.277 Re-
cently, however, as sovereign borrowers like Mexico and Ar-
gentina have come to the brink of default,2 71 commercial banks
have been more receptive to the Fund's renegotiation pro-
cess. 2 7 9 Although private commercial banks cannot directly
impose stabilization programs on sovereign governments, 2
0
during this period preferred the more predictable risk of domestic bonds to the un-
certainty of heavily indebted foreign governments. Id. at 140.
274. Comment, supra note 4, at 860. The Paris Club, named for its usual meet-
ing place, began in 1956 When Argentina asked the Fund to reschedule the repay-
ment of its debt. Id. at 862. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Argentina's early attitude toward the Fund.
The Paris Club meetings occur in three stages. First, the official creditors such
as the Fund, the World Bank, and the Organisation For Economic Co-Operation and
Development, meet separately. Id. This meeting, like the others, is for official credi-
tors only. Id. at 863. Commercial bank creditors have no official role at the Paris
Club meetings. Second, the Fund and the debtor meet to discuss stabilization meas-
ures that the nation will install as a condition to the renegotiation of its obligations.
Id. Finally, the creditors meet to discuss the terms of the renegotiation and sign
agreed minutes. Id. The Fund later transcribes the minutes into a binding bilateral
agreement. Id.
275. Id. at 858.
276. Id.
277. POLICY IssuEs, supra note 4, at 123.
278. See supra notes 138-41, 190-96 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 75-77.
280. POLICY IssuEs, supra note 4, at 124. A second effect of this indirect ap-
proach is that it "reduce[s] the risk that availability of unconditional bank lending
may dissuade the country from seeking conditional IMF assistance." Id.
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the Fund's renegotiation process allows the private lenders to
indirectly impose the conditions necessary to resuscitate the
borrower's economy.28 1
B. The Fund and Commercial Banks Form a Coordinated Response
to Mexico's Suspension of Debt Repayment
Before the Mexican crisis of 1982, the Fund and the com-
mercial banks did not have a coordinated response to sover-
eign default.28 2 When Mexico suspended payments on its for-
eign loans in August of 1982, many of Mexico's creditors were
caught by surprise. 28" The Fund and the banks did not have a
coordinated response to the crisis until several months after
Mexico announced that it was suspending repayments.284 By
November of 1982, the Fund's Managing Director Jacques de
Larosiere had ascertained that the banks' response to the Mex-
ican situation was ineffective. 285 De Larosi~re seized the initia-
tive by calling Mexico's leading bank creditors to a meeting at
the Federal Reserve in New York. By calling this meeting, de
Larosi~re made what one banker termed an unprecedented
move.2 16 De Larosiere informed the bankers that he had an
adjustment plan for Mexico, but would not seek the board's
approval of the program unless the banks provided the neces-
sary funds. 28 7 He told the banks that the Fund needed a total
commitment of U.S.$6.5 billion, with U.S.$5 billion in new fi-
281. Id.
282. See Field, Shirreff & Ollard, The IMF and Central Banks Flex Their Muscles,
Euromoney, Jan. 1983, at 35, 38. In 1979, for example, when the Turkish Govern-
ment needed to renegotiate U.S.$3 billion in short-term commercial bank loans, the
banks refused to extend further credit to Turkey, and left the nation's problems to
the Fund. Id. at 38. In early 1982, several months before Mexico asked the Fund to
reschedule its debt, the banks again refused to extend additional credit to Hungary
when that nation fell behind on its debt service payments. Id.
283. Id.; Adam, Is Salvation Any Nearer?, Euromoney, Mar. 1983, at 22, 23-24.
284. Id. at 27.
285. Id.
286. See Field, Shirreff & Ollard, The IMF and Central Banks Flex Their Muscles,
Euromoney, Jan. 1983, at 39. The meeting is significant because it indicates the im-
portance the banks attached to the Mexican crisis. Although the banks were under
no obligation to attend this meeting, as a practical matter the large United States
banks had no alternative. See The IMF Orders Banks to Keep Mexico Afloat, Bus. Week,
Dec. 6, 1982, at 35. As one banker noted, " '[y]ou don't have to convince Chase and
Bank of America to stay in this thing . . . . They've no place to run.'" Id.
287. Field, Shirreff & Ollard, The IMF and Central Banks Flex Their Muscles,
Euromoney, Jan. 1983, at 38.
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nancing by December 15.288 Under the Fund's plan, the com-
mercial banks also were to roll over U.S.$20 million in Mexican
loans.289
There are several reasons why the Fund responded to the
Mexican crisis so aggressively. First, the banks were reacting
to the crisis slowly, partly because many of the Mexican loans
were syndicate loans. 290 Approximately 1,400 banks had an in-
terest in the restructuring of Mexico's foreign debt,29 1 and
some of the smaller bank creditors were not cooperating. 292
Second, the Fund may have been better prepared for the crisis
than the banks. While officials at the Fund anticipated Mex-
ico's repayment problems as early as mid-1981, the banks did
not forsee the crisis,293 and were surprised to learn that so
much of the country's obligations were short-term.294 More
importantly, the Fund intervened because only the Fund has
the legal authority to impose conditions on the deals it negoti-
ates with sovereign borrowers.295
288. Id.
289. Farnsworth, A Dramatic Change at the IMF, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1983, at F1,
col. 2, at FIO, col. 1.
290. Field, Shirreff & Ollard, The IMF and Central Banks Flex Their Muscles,
Euromoney, Jan. 1983, at 35, 38.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. The IMF and Latin America, Economist, Dec. 11-17, 1982, at 69, 76. In order
to encourage members to provide the Fund with accurate information about their
balance-of-payments, the Fund keeps information about its members confidential.
Id.; see Second Fund Amendment, supra note 3, art. VIII.
294. The IMF and Latin America, Economist, Dec. 11-17, 1982, at 69, 72-73. The
problem with short-term financing in countries like Mexico and Argentina is that
"large volumes of long-term financing needs are being met through medium-term
credit instruments funded by short-term deposits. This process of intermediation
inherently involves refinancing or rescheduling . ..since the purpose of the loan
does not match the maturity of the financing and funding instruments." POLICY Is-
SUES, supra note 4, at 35.
295. See supra notes 212-49 and accompanying text (discussing the banks' alter-
natives to conditions to international loans); see also supra notes 53-77 and accompa-
nying text (discussing conditionality).
One senior United States banker's comment on the Fund's assertive role in the
Mexican crisis reveals the industry's reliance on Fund conditionality to safeguard
their loans: "We can't really have a situation preserved where we come in at the
IMF's behest and then find out that they get out before the commercial banks can,
otherwise we'd lose the element of conditionality." Field, Shirreff& Ollard, The LJF
and Central Banks Flex Their Muscles, Euromoney, Jan. 1983, at 44; see also supra text
accompanying notes 75-78.
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C. The Development of Debtor and Creditor "Cartels"
1. The Debtor Group
In the nineteenth century, international economic transac-
tions were predominantly private.296 Governments were lim-
ited to maintaining a gold standard that automatically regu-
lated the currency, and negotiating straightforward commer-
cial treaties that would enhance the nation's commercial and
navigational positions. 29 During the first half of the twentieth
century, governments increased their participation in interna-
tional economic and financial transactions and also expanded
their role in the domestic economy. 98 Membership in joint
sovereignty organizations like the Fund and the World Bank
gave member governments control over economic areas previ-
ously dominated by private interests.2 99
As developing nations like Mexico and Argentina grew in-
creasingly dependent on the Fund as a source of financing,
300
the Fund's membership became polarized. This polarization
began in the early 1960's when the United States announced
296. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 210 (1962).
297. Id. at 210-11.
298. Id. An example of this change is the Drago Doctrine. This doctrine arose
from two incidents in Latin America during the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. See P. JEsSUP, supra note 1, at 113. The first incident began in 1859, when the
Mexican Government defaulted on a loan from a Swiss-French banking firm. Id.
Three years later, when France invaded Mexico and installed Maximillian as the Em-
peror of Mexico, France cited Mexico's default as the justification for their action. Id.
The second incident occurred in 1902, when Venezuela defaulted on foreign loans to
three European countries, Britain, Germany, and Italy, which then retaliated by
blockading Venezuela's ports. Id. Following the blockade, Argentine Foreign Minis-
ter Drago proposed to the United States that they endorse an international agree-
ment barring the use of force to collect sovereign debts. Id. Drago argued that the
parties to a sovereign loan agreement contract with the understanding that the
lender cannot seek specific performance in any court. Id.; see Drago, State Loans and
Their Relation to International Policy, I AM.J. INT'L. L. 692, 724-25 (1907). Secretary of
State Elihu Root supported Drago's proposal and the doctrine was incorporated into
the Porter Convention and signed at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907.
P. JEssuP, supra note 1, at 113. The Porter Convention prohibited the use of force to
collect unpaid foreign loans whenever the debtor rejected arbitration or failed to
comply with the arbitrator's award. Id. This language is now reflected in the United
Nations Charter's restrictions on the use of force. U.N. CHARTER art. 103 (United
Nations Charter prevails over conflicting international agreements); P. JESSUP, supra
note 1, at 114.
299. P. JEssuP, supra note 1, at 114.
300. See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
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that it might need to borrow from the Fund's reserves.30 ' The
Executive Directors, concerned that the Fund's resources
could not meet United States' demand, drafted a decision, the
General Agreement to Borrow (GAB), proposing the creation
of an advisory group known as the Group of Ten. 0 2 The
Group of Ten's voting power in the Fund was sufficient to pass
the Executive Director's decision over the objections of many
developing nations.305
The Group of Ten antagonized members from developing
nations in the late 1960's, when it began negotiating to create
a new reserve asset for the Fund. 0 4 After the Fund passed an
amendment in 1968,305 a group of developing countries
formed a counterpart to the Group of Ten known as the Group
301. Gold, Uniformity As A Legal Principle of the International Monetary Fund, 7 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 765, 791-92 (1975).
302. Id. The Group of Ten is comprised of eight nations: Belgium, Canada,
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
and two European central banks, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Sverignes Rik-
sbank. Participants and Amounts of Credit Arrangements, IMF Doc. 1289-(62/1)
(Jan. 5, 1962) reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 79
(1970). The Group of Ten would determine when the Fund should use its power to
borrow money granted by the Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. VII, § (2). Gold,
supra note 301, at 792. The General Agreement to Borrow (GAB) proposed that the
Fund could use its article VII § (2) power only when the Fund needed to borrow
money to cover transactions with members of the Group of Ten. Id.
303. Gold, supra note 301, at 792; General Agreement To Borrow, IMF Doc.
(1289-(62/1) (Oct. 24, 1962) reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE Di-
RECTORS 68 (1970). Many Fund members objected to the exclusivity of GAB because
it appeared to violate the Fund Agreement's principle of uniformity among members.
Gold, supra note 301, at 807-08. "Uniformity" is the combination of two concepts.
Id. at 765-67. Uniformity means that the Fund Agreement creates the same rights
and obligations for all members. Id. The term also means that the Fund's financial
and regulatory policies apply equally to all members. Id. The principle of uniformity
is consistent with the Fund's goal of "promoting international monetary coopera-
tion." Id.; see Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. I, § (i).
For developing countries, uniformity is a two-edged sword. On one side, devel-
oping countries may use uniformity to ensure that they receive as many benefits from
the Fund as do other members. Gold, supra note 301, at 766. On the other side,
uniformity prevents developing countries from arguing that they should get prefer-
ential treatment from the Fund because they need more assistance than other mem-
bers. Id.
304. Id. at 807-08. The Group ofTen initially wanted to limit the discussion of
SDR's to members that had a "substantial amount of gold" and were the "major
trading and financial countries." Id. (citing Group of Ten, Report to Ministers and
Governors by the Group of Deputies (July 7, 1966)).
305. First Fund Amendment, supra note 3.
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of Twenty-Four.3 °6 Throughout the 1970's, this group lobbied
for the adoption of several measures designed to enhance their
bargaining position with the Fund and commercial bank lend-
ers.3 0 7 The developing members' lobbying efforts met with
some success in 1978 when the Fund approved the second
amendment to the articles, 30 8 and in mid-1979 when the Exec-
utive Directors passed a decision loosening the requirements
of conditionality.30 9
Rumors of a Latin American "debtor's cartel" surfaced
periodically in the international financial press following the
rescheduling of Mexico's debt in late 1982.3 '0 Throughout
1983 and 1984, smaller Latin American debtors, particularly
306. Report of the Chairperson of the Group of Twenty-Four, Manila (Jan. 26-
Feb. 7, 1976), reprinted in V COLLECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE GROUP OF 77, at 285
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Group of Twenty-Four].
307. Gold, supra note 301, at 782. The Group of Twenty-Four consists of eight
ministers or senior officials from each of the following regions: Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. Id. n. 53.
One of the Group of Twenty-Four's proposals was the idea of linking the Fund's
allocation of SDR's to development assistance. See id. at 782. The Group of Twenty-
Four also proposed a reform of the Fund's lending system. Id. at 796. The Group
wanted developed countries to grant debtor nations easier access to the financial
markets, and wanted the developed nations to exempt developing countries from
controls on imports and long-term investment. Id. at 797. The group also hoped to
establish a new advisory committee that would protect the interests of indebted na-
tions. Id. at 798. This committee, the Council, would review with the Executive Di-
rectors "the aggregate net flow of real resources to developing countries, its financ-
ing, and the consistency of the balance of payments aims of countries with their
targets for the transfer of resources to developing countries." Id. The Council and
the Executive Directors would be required to consider the special circumstances of
developing countries when making their review. Id.
308. Second Fund Amendment, supra note 3; see J. GOLD, supra note 63, at 11.
The Second Amendment continued to require the Fund to impose conditions on the
use of its resources, Second Fund Amendment, supra note 3, art. V, § 3, but for the
first time provided that the Fund "may have special policies for special balance of
payments problems, provided that these policies also involve conditionality." .J.
GOLD, supra note 63, at 11. One such special policy was the "extended arrange-
ment," which provided a longer repayment period than the traditional one year limit
of stand-by arrangements. Second Fund Amendment, supra note 3, art. V, § 3(a); J.
GOLD, supra note 63, at 11-12.
309. J. GOLD, supra note 63, at 15. Although "[m]ost of the decision is declara-
tory of the practice that has emerged in the years since 1968, . . . the decision in-
cludes certain new or clarified elements, largely in deference to the views of develop-
ing members." Id.
310. See, e.g., Debtor Nations Throw Down the Gauntlet-Gently, Bus. Week, July 9,
1984, at 98; A New Crunch for Third World Debt, Bus. Week, May 28, 1984, at 28; Gang of
Four, Economist, May 26-June 1, 1984, at 88, 93; Werrett, Looking for Financial
Medicine, Inst. Inv., July 1983, at 279.
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Bolivia and Ecuador, proposed that the region's debtors form
a negotiating cartel against the Fund and the commercial
banks.3 11 These countries hoped that a cartel could use its
joint bargaining strength to negotiate lower financial
charges.312 The large Latin American debtors ignored the car-
tel proposal at first,313 but in May of 1984, the Presidents of
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico issued a joint state-
ment calling for the reduction of interest rates and other finan-
cial charges and for longer grace periods and maturities on re-
negotiated loans.3 4 Finance ministers from these countries
met with their counterparts from Bolivia and Ecuador in late
May,315 and again in June. 16
2. The Creditor Group
In debt reschedulings of recent years, the Fund's condi-
tionality has created the "knowledge or presumption that the
international institutions would be available to provide assist-
ance in case of need . . .[and] a strong incentive for banks to
expand excessively their exposure to potential problem coun-
tries. ' 1 7 The November 1982 creditors meeting orchestrated
by the Fund not only encouraged the creditors to enlarge their
311. Gang of Four, Economist, May 26-June 1, 1984, at 88, 93.
312. Id. In a May, 1983 meeting in Quito, Ecuador, the United Nations' Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America and a regional debtor's club, the Sistema Eco-
nomico Latinamericano, urged Latin American debtors to combine their information
on the terms of their foreign loans. Werrett, Looking for Financial Medicine, Inst. Inv.,
July 1983, at 279.
313. Many Patients, Little Medicine, Euromoney, Mar. 1983, at 36, 46.
314. Gang of Four, Economist, May 26-June 1, 1984, at 88.
315. Id.
316. Riding, Latin Debt: Postponing The Burden, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, at F9,
col. 1. The large Latin American debtors may have decided to use the image of a
cartel in mid-1984 for several reasons. First, the United States' prime rate rose by
1.5% during the first five months of 1984. Gang of Four, Economist, May 26-June 1,
1984, at 88. This increase in interest rates was sufficient to "offset virtually all the $1
billion increase in [Mexico's] nontraditional exports so painfully achieved in 1983."
Id. Second, debtors like Mexico and Argentina may have seen the "negotiating car-
tel" as a way to project a show of force for the benefit of the United States and
European countries meeting at the economic summit in London on June 7. See id. In
addition, Argentina's support for joint action was a reaction to domestic politics.
The Peronist party was criticizing the newly elected Alfonsin for his "willingness to
negotiate with the IMF." A New Crunch for Third World Debt, Bus. Week, May 28, 1984,
at 29. The Peronists, who controlled the Argentine Senate, were pressuring Alfonsin
to end negotiations with the Fund and bargain directly with the banks. Id.
317. POLICY ISSUES, supra note 4, at 124.
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exposure to foreign loans, but created a counterbalance to the
emerging image of a "debtor's cartel."" 8 The large commer-
cial banks have openly acted in concert only on limited occa-
sions and for limited purposes.3' 9
V. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF DEBTOR NATIONS. THE
ILLUSORY DISTINCTION
Accepted definitions of sovereignty distinguish between
an infringement of a state's sovereignty and its dependence on
the economic conditions of another nation.3 2 ° This distinction
turns on the perception that economic dependency occurs vol-
untarily, while a violation of a nation's sovereignty is beyond
the state's control. 2 ' When used to evaluate the impact of
enormous international loans on the sovereignty of debtor na-
tions, this distinction between voluntary and involuntary ac-
tions loses its significance. Through their unprecedented vol-
ume of foreign debt, countries like Mexico and Argentina have
moved beyond export-import dependency into a state of sym-
biosis. 322
The traditional legal concept of sovereignty as "absolute,
uncontrolled state will," designed to protect the territorial in-
tegrity of the state, no longer is a useful framework for the
analysis of international problems. 324 By founding interna-
tional organizations and developing international law, the in-
ternational community has attempted to "substitut[e] some
kind of joint sovereignty, the supremacy of common will," 325
for the traditional parameters of a state's authority.
The concept of "joint sovereignty" also has become inad-
equate for the purpose of analyzing modern international
debt. 6  The media of international economic cooperation,
particularly the Fund, have encouraged the formation of two
318. See supra notes 220-316 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 284-89 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note I and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text; see also Solomon, supra note
104 at 361.
323. P. JESSUP, supra note 1, at 40-41.
324. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
325. P. JESSUP, supra note 1, at 13.
326. See supra notes 30-43, 79-89 and accompanying text.
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opposing powers: the commercial banks and their sovereign
debtors. Joint sovereignty drew these forces together, but the
debt problem these groups administer is now beyond the con-
trol of the mechanisms of joint sovereignty 27
The international community could respond to this devel-
opment in a number of ways. A coalition of member nations
from the United Nations, the Group of 77, has formed a move-
ment for a New International Monetary Order which proposes,
inter alia, the reorganization of the Fund as an institution de-
voted to the long-term development needs of its members.3 2 8
The Fund has not followed this plan because it would require
fundamental changes in the Fund's mandate as a forum for
resolving temporary balance-of-payments problems. In addi-
tion, such a proposal is also politically unworkable because its
underlying goal is the redistribution of wealth and power from
developed to developing nations.3 2 9 Another way to bring the
current debt situation within the existing structure of interna-
tional law would be to expand the role of central banks like the
United States Federal Reserve. This proposal is also politically
unworkable. Despite the Federal Reserve's keen interest in the
renegotiation of foreign sovereign debt, and its significant con-
tribution to renegotiations since the Mexican crisis of 19 8 2 ,3 °
the central bank must continue to be a subtle participant in the
resolution of such debt problems. If it did formally participate
in the renegotiation process on the international level, the cen-
tral bank's actions would "imply inherently controversial eco-
nomic political judgments about other countries by the U.S.
government, "331 and would increase debtor nation's fear of in-
terference with reserved economic rights. A better solution
327. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
328. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR 6th Special Supp. (No. 1) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/9599
(1974); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No.31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9946 (1975). Article 17 of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States provides that "[e]very State should co-operate
with the efforts of developing countries to accelerate their economic and social devel-
opment by .. .extending active assistance to them, consistent with their develop-
ment needs and objectives, with strict respect for the sovereign equality of States and
free of any conditions derogating from their sovereignty." Id. at 53-54.
329. See Report of the Group of Twenty-Four, supra note 306, at 286.
330. See supra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
331. Volcker, How Serious is U.S. Bank Exposure?, Challenge, May-June 1983, at
11, 17.
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would be to create a special international forum to address the
present and future needs of the commercial banks and their
sovereign debtors. Such an organization would legitimize the
influence of commercial bank creditors, restore the credibility
of Fund conditionality, and prevent the use of "sovereignty" to
justify repudiation of international obligations and the eco-
nomic cooperation such obligations represent.
CONCLUSION
Modern economic interdependence, in the form of im-
mense foreign debt, cannot be dismissed as a voluntary condi-
tion that preserves the autonomy of sovereign states. Existing
levels of international debt, exacerbated by the lending poli-
cies of a supranational structure that increased the participa-
tion of private commercial banks, blur the line between volun-
tary and involuntary action. At one moment the commercial
banks appear to be managing the economies of their sovereign
debtors through the conduit of Fund conditionality. At the
next moment, the debtors appear to have the upper hand, us-
ing their indebtedness in short-term money to perpetually de-
lay repayment. The banks manipulate the debtor's need for
renegotiation, while the debtors manipulate the banks' need to
remain solvent. Every change in the variables of modern eco-
nomic interdependence: political control, exports, interest
rates, and oil supply, shifts this delicate balance of need and
power. Escalating foreign debt and the increased exposure of
private commercial banks has created a new economic relation-
ship that is beyond the existing legal framework for joint inter-
national cooperation.
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